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ABSTRACT
Who chooses suicide attacks? Though rebels typically target poor countries, suicide attacks are just
as likely to target rich democracies. Though many groups have grievances, suicide attacks are
favored by the radical religious. Though rebels often kill coreligionists, they seldom use suicide
attacks to do so. We model the choice of tactics by rebels, bearing in mind that a successful suicide
attack imposes the ultimate cost on the attacker and the organization. We first ask what a suicide
attacker would have to believe to be deemed rational. We then embed the attacker and other
operatives in a club good model which emphasizes the function of voluntary religious organizations
as providers of benign local public goods. The sacrifices which these groups demand solve a free-
rider problem in the cooperative production of public goods. These sacrifices make clubs well suited
for organizing suicide attacks, a tactic in which defection by operatives (including the attacker)
endangers the entire organization. The model also analyzes the choice of suicide attacks as a tactic,
predicting that suicide will be used when targets are well protected and when damage is great. Those
predictions are consistent with the patterns described above. The model has testable implications for
tactic choice of terrorists and for damage achieved by different types of terrorists, which we find to
be consistent with the data.
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Introduction
The suicide attack is a gruesome tactic of rebellion which imposes the ultimate
cost on the attacker. Why would leaders of rebellions employ it? Under what conditions
will suicide attacks succeed? What kinds of rebels use it most effectively? Our answers
are as follows. Where states are strong and their targets well-protected, rebel
organizations cannot successfully use standard insurgency tactics. Yet under those
conditions, suicide attacks can be devastatingly effective. While recruiting suicide
attackers is easier than many surmise, recruiting operatives resistant to defection in these
high-stakes attacks is a first-order tactical problem. Radical religious organizations that
require sacrifices as signals of commitment, and in return provide concrete benefits, are
better able to insulate themselves against defection. We rely on a club model to analyze
such organizations, explaining four patterns in data on suicide attacks: (a) their targets
are in higher income countries than those of standard insurgencies; (b) perpetrators and
victims are generally of different religions; (c) “hybrid” organizations which provide
benign local public goods such as education and welfare are more effective killing
operations; and (d) suicide attacks are more likely against hard targets - targets for which
an effective attack makes escape unlikely.
Our argument draws on two literatures, the political science of insurgencies and
the economics of religion. In section 1 we use a newly constructed dataset (described in
the Appendix) to present two patterns. First, compared to the environmental conditions
favoring insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003) the tactic of suicide attacks tends to be
chosen when targets are harder, while conventional insurgency is chosen when targets are
soft (i.e., their destruction is possible with lesser risk to attackers). Second, suicide
attacks tend to be chosen when the perpetrator and target are of different religions.
In section 2, we provide a theoretical foundation for both patterns. To do so, we
first outline the beliefs that suicide attackers would need to hold for their actions to be
deemed rational (Wintrobe 2002). We then consider the attacker and his organization in a
rational choice framework. The model, relying on Iannaccone (1992) and Berman (2003),
shows why “clubs” of a certain type (most easily formed through religious membership)Berman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 3
are able to organize high-stakes suicide attacks despite strong incentives for operatives to
defect.
Tactics, our formal model shows, vary across targets. As targets are hardened
(i.e., chances of escape are reduced) suicide attacks are increasingly favored because they
allow even well defended targets to be destroyed while preventing apprehension of the
attacker and exposure of the network. For hard enough targets this advantage outweighs
the cost of losing a member (the attacker) with certainty. Thus as states become more
powerful and better able to defend targets, suicide attacks are used more often.
In section 3, we test implications of the model. First, suicide attacks are in general
more likely to be used against well protected (hard) targets than against poorly-defended
(soft) targets.  Second, hybrid organizations are able to carry out suicide attacks more
effectively because they have better mechanisms to prevent defection.
In the conclusion we address an anomaly. The Tamils in Sri Lanka perpetrate the
second largest number of suicide attacks in our sample period. Although most of the
attacks are interreligious, the perpetrators are not members of a radical religious club. We
then suggest future empirical extensions that follow from the theory.  We also discuss the
key policy implication: the better states and markets are at providing social services, the
harder it is for insurgencies to organize around a social-service provision base and
conduct high stakes attacks without fear of defection.Berman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 4
 . Civil war is a violent conflict between an organized militia and the armies of a state, involving contest
1
for control over a region or the entire territory of the state. Enumeration requires at least 1,000 deaths
recorded as a direct result, concentrated temporally close to its onset, with at least 10 percent of the deaths
being civilians or soldiers on the government’s side. For details see Fearon and Laitin (2003).
 . FL rely on two datasets: a revised MAR group/country dataset of over 400
2
minority/ethnic/religious/regional groups in over 100 countries; and a country/year data set of all countries
of over 500,000 in every year since 1945. Replication data are available at
http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/workingpapers/papers.htm]. 
Section 1. Background and Conjectures
Insurgency
Insurgency is a technology of rebellion through guerilla warfare that has been
successful in challenging regime domination in many countries. It has been hitched to
various ideologies: communism, nationalism, religious fanaticism, and even to no
ideology at all (the FARC in Colombia)!  Between1945 and 1999, 127 civil wars in 73
different countries accounted for more than sixteen million deaths.  Many of these relied
1
upon the technology of rural insurgency.
Fearon and Laitin (2003, hereafter FL) show that civil wars cannot be explained
by: (a) level of grievances in the society or (b) degree of ethnic or religious difference or
any form of civilizational clash. Rather, the best predictors of civil war are conditions
favoring the success of the rural insurgency technology: bad roads, rough terrain, poor
state armies, lack of more remunerative employment for young men (as compared to
being an insurgent), and weak and new governments.  
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This research yields an insurgent profile. He is poor (with few alternative career
paths than insurgency), from an impoverished country (but not necessarily a backward
region within that country, as internal migration from a poor to a rich region is an
attractive alternative to insurgency). This country is likely to have a considerable swath
of rough terrain not easily accessible by the armed forces of the state. Rough terrain is
important for insurgency survival in part because of the inherent difficulty of the terrain,
but is magnified in low GDP/capita countries, as GDP/capita is a good proxy for a weakBerman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 5
 . Weinstein (forthcoming) shows greater variance in the degree to which insurgents are privy to the
3
ideological message of their insurgency than suggested in this paragraph.
state with a badly organized, low information army, an army that would not perform well
under harsh conditions. Armies in poor states, for lack of reliable information, rely
heavily on indiscriminate bombing that has the unintended effect of enriching the pool of
potential recruits, thereby helping to sustain the insurgency. Recruits are typically young
men, unemployed, ill-educated, and therefore only remotely involved in grasping the
ideological message of leadership.
3
Suicide Attacks as a Tactic
Guerrilla warfare by insurgents encompasses a variety of tactics – most typically
a network of self-sustaining rural militias that first intimidate populations and then
govern them, providing alternate sovereignty. Suicide attacks –in which the attacker will
almost certainly die if the attack succeeds – are here interpreted as a tactic of rebellion
distinct from typical insurgency tactics – in which the attacker has at least some chance
of survival. For example, we see Al-Qa’ida as (in large part) a violent movement to
overthrow the Saudi monarchy and other governments in Muslim countries, but not one
relying on insurgency. Its suicide attacks in Tanzania, Kenya, Bali and the US were
organized not to overthrow those governments, but rather to recruit support for
movements that would challenge regimes (such as the Saudi) not based on their
interpretation of Islam. The Al-Qa’ida attacks on the US in September 2001 also sought
to reduce American military support for the Saudi regime. This perspective interprets
Hamas and other Palestinian militias as engaged in a rebellion with two goals: to
establish sovereignty in part (or all) of what is today Israel and her occupied territories
and additionally to control the government of an eventual Palestinian state. 
Although an ancient tactic in inter-state warfare, suicide attacks are relatively
rare. They were not used as a modern tactic of internal rebellion until 1983 when
Hizbullah employed suicide attacks to challenge the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. The
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka followed suit with the secondBerman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 6
 . Krueger and Maleckova (2002). While the jury is still out on whether suicide attackers are more upscale
4
than the average person in their society, we can be more confident in claiming that he or she is more highly
educated than the typical member of a rural insurgency.
 . Insurgents are most likely to be male; suicide bombers draw from both genders.
5
 . Wintrobe (2003) offers a similar conjecture in discussing the demand side for terror, that is, why leaders
6
would ask for such sacrifices among their closest followers.
major series of suicide attacks taking place beginning in 1987 (combined with
conventional insurgency tactics). Suicide attacks have been employed (at least twice) in
civil wars in only seven of the sixty-nine countries facing insurgencies in the last half of
the 20  century. Table 1 lists those seven countries, and the three with only a single
th
recorded suicide attack.
Why are suicide attacks so rarely used by rebels? It is best to start with a profile
of a suicide bomber as culled from the literature. He or she appears to be quite distinct
from the typical recruit in a rural insurgency.  The suicide bomber is more upscale
4
economically, and more highly educated on average. (We surmise from this that he or
she knows and relates to the ideological message of leadership, making grievances more
consequential as a motivating force).  The country of his victim is richer, and along with
5  
its wealth it has a competent army. Unlike the hopeless economic conditions that are
ideal for insurgency, suicide bombers have moderate employment opportunities outside
of the rebellion. The country’s terrain is more easily accessed by the state. Comparing
existing research on insurgencies with that on suicide attacks suggests a conjecture:
C1: When insurgency is favored, suicide terrorism decreases in value; where insurgency
is disfavored, leaders need alternate means to succeed, and without a guerrilla force as a
real threat, insurgents seek through spectacular heroic events demonstrating their
tactical prowess and their commitment to the cause to gain advantage over a ruling
regime.
The intuition is straightforward.  Suicide bombing is a costly tactic, as it strips the
6
insurgent organization of its human capital. It would be difficult if not impossible toBerman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 7
 . This reasoning is consistent with the non-use of kamikaze pilots by the Japanese military until American
7
targets were too hard for conventional warfare. See Rosenthal (forthcoming) “Suicide Bombing: What is
the Answer?” 
 . The Fearon/Laitin replication dataset ends in 1999. Yet many of the suicide missions reported in the ICT
8
dataset are from 2000-2002. None of the results are qualitatively changed by adding the years 2000-2002 to
recruit an impoverished young man who knows nothing about the ideals of the
organization to volunteer for certain death. To be sure, as was apparently the case for the
September 11, 2001 attacks, organizations can utilize ill-trained foot soldiers to support
an operation that is led by adepts. And it is often the case that insurgent organizations can
recruit volunteers who individually paid the costs of ideological training as a by-product
of their religious or civic participation. But for all leaders, whether paid for by the
organization or not, ideological training appears necessary, and there are organizational
opportunity costs to losing these highly motivated and well-versed members. If
sustaining the insurgency were easy, such losses would be wasteful.
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To test this conjecture, we used the FL dataset on insurgency onsets to predict
suicide attacks in a particular country/year. We code the attack by the nationality of the
perpetrators’ organization rather than that of the victim. The motives of suicide attackers
are complex, variable among attackers, and impossible to verify. But we hold it
reasonable to assume that at least part of the motive is to challenge the perpetrators’
“home” government, even when the targets are external. For even if the attackers wish to
destroy the foreign government whose civilians they have killed, the attackers surely
disapprove of the fact that their home governments receive support from that foreign
country. They are acting as international agents of their country because the principals
are in their assessment illegitimate or lack resolve.  With this assumption, we can
compare the country/years in which civil war onset took place with suicide attacks to see
if suicide tactics are chosen in part as a consequence of the conditions that (dis)favor
insurgency. 
Table 2 compares the relationship of per-capita income with civil wars on the one
hand and with suicide attacks on the other.  The bottom panel reports on countries
8Berman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 8
the data and using GDP/capita in 1999 to proxy for current GDP/capita.
currently experiencing civil wars, reporting the linear probability regression of a war
indicator on GDP/capita (lagged one year, from the Penn World Tables) and an estimate
of the proportion of mountainous terrain. GDP/capita has a consistently negative
coefficient, both across countries and within countries over time (provided the regression
allows for a trend by including the year as a predictor). Doubling GDP/capita reduces the
probability of suffering a civil war by 8-10 percentage points. The top panel, in contrast,
shows that GDP/capita predicts a small and statistically insignificant change in the
number of annual suicide attacks, both between countries and within countries over time
(provided again that the regression allows for a trend increase in attacks in all countries).
The cross sectional results also indicate that mountains do not predict suicide attacks,
though they do predict civil wars. Taken together, the regression results indicate that the
while poor, mountainous countries are likely to suffer civil wars, they are no more likely
to suffer suicide attacks than richer, flatter countries.
The difficulty of conducting an insurgency is therefore a condition favoring the
use of a costly tactic such as suicide attacks. This helps explain Israel, which has suffered
most acutely from 100 such attacks during the sample period. Israel is a developed,
relatively flat, small country with a brilliantly equipped army that has invested heavily in
information. The conditions for insurgency in Israel, given the FL model, are not
propitious.  Under these conditions, standard rural guerrilla tactics are less likely to
succeed, making suicide attacks a relatively effective tactic.
C1, focusing on conditions unfavorable for insurgency as an incentive to employ
suicide bombing, conditioned on there being a rebel movement, has some interesting
exceptions. There are several cases where insurgency is disfavored, yet rebel groups have
nonetheless emerged which do not employ suicide attacks. These cases include South
Africa (the ANC), Spain’s Basque Country (ETA), Japan (Aum Shinrikyo), Italy (Red
Brigades), and Germany (Baader Meinhof). They suggest a second conjecture.
C2: Where conditions do not favor insurgency, suicide attacks remain extraordinarily
difficult to sustain. The conditions that help sustain suicide attacks remain to beBerman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 9
specified, but religious difference between the perpetrators and the victims helps to fulfill
at least one of these conditions. 
As with the case of the kamikaze pilots (Shinto pilots and largely Christian
victims), the suicide attacks in our dataset were most often marked by a religious
difference between the attackers and the victims. In Israel (Muslims vs. Jews), Sri Lanka
(Hindus vs. Buddhists), Russia (Muslims vs. Eastern Orthodox Christians), and China
(Muslims vs. Buddhists), religious difference marked perpetrator from victim. In the two
cases from Saudi Arabia, although the forces of Al-Qa’ida seek to overthrow their
coreligionists, their suicide attacks were aimed mostly against Christians. In Egypt, the
suicide attack was by Muslim fundamentalists against the secular Muslims housed in the
Egyptian embassy in Pakistan. While this does not support the conjecture, the argument
about the importance of religion is not clearly undermined. Only the four cases
perpetrated by the PKK (the Kurds) in Turkey are clearly disconfirming. But overall,
89.9 percent of the suicide attacks were aimed at victims whose religion was different
from the attackers’. Table 3 presents data confirming this finding.
In contrast to suicide attacks, most insurgencies pit coreligionists against each
other. In the FL data, only 18.4 percent of civil wars were fought between guerrillas
predominantly from one religious group against armies of a state who were largely of a
different religious group. In three of these cases, suicide attacks were used: Sri Lanka,
Russia (Chechnya), and China (Xinjiang). Cases such as Nagorno-Karabakh in
Azerbaijan, Srpska Republic in Bosnia, and rebellions in Nigeria, Philippines, Sudan,
Cyprus and Bangladesh all pitted guerrilla armies against states that were led by people
of a different religion. In these cases, however, conditions favoring insurgency were
better, lessening the need for the extreme tactic of suicide attacks. Only the IRA in
Northern Ireland is an example of low probability of insurgency along with religious
difference, yet no suicide attacks. (This is the only case that meets the standards of C1
and C2, yet for which there have been no suicide attacks). If this conjecture proves to be
correct, then the view that suicide attacks represent an outlier from the general conditions
for insurgency is further confirmed. This conjecture suggests that only in the subset ofBerman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 10
. We build on the work especially of Merari (1990) in psychology, Pape (2003, 2005) and Bloom (2005) in political
9
science, and Wintrobe (2003) in economics. 
. This discussion owes most of its content to a conversation with Larry Iannaccone.
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rebellions where religious difference can be identified (or manufactured through relevant
attacks on foreigners) are suicide attacks likely.
These conjectures and the evidence supporting them are provocative. Yet they
have as yet little theoretical foundation, especially C2. While one could easily
hypothesize that attackers believe suicide attacks ensure eternal grace, a reward that
would not come from killing coreligionists, one would face the challenge of explaining
the extraordinary degree of religious conviviality in the world when such great rewards
are available for killing one’s neighbor (albeit of a different religion). To be sure, careful
work in the social sciences, most notably in psychology, political science and economics
has theorized about the questions that motivate this paper.  However, the goal of this
9
paper – to link radical religious organizations, rich countries, and the tactic of suicide
attacks – transcends the disciplinary boundaries set by the current literature. Rather than
focusing on the strategic rationality of suicide attacks (as do Pape 2005 and Bloom
2005), our focus is on the tactical choice of suicide attacks as compared to more
conventional insurgency tactics.
Section 2. Rational Martyrs and Terrorist Clubs: A Framework
Rational Martyrs
10
Much of the terror generated by suicide attacks comes from the idea of an army of 
theologically-motivated suicidal drones. Yet they could be rational, given either: a) a
belief in the hereafter combined with a belief that the suicidal act will be rewarded in the
hereafter, or b) altruism toward family or compatriots combined with a belief that the
suicidal act will benefit family, community or some larger cause (Wintrobe 2003).
A given population is likely to hold at least some individuals who hold these
beliefs. To be sure, mainstream Islam, like its theological cousins Christianity andBerman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 11
 Neither Christianity nor Judaism has consistently extended that sanctity to civilians of other religions.
11
Samson, who clearly targeted civilians, is memorialized as a martyr by both Jews and Christians.
Judaism, sanctifies human life.  Yet belief in the hereafter is widespread, as is belief in
11
rewards in the hereafter. (In fact, most American Christians believe in heaven and most
of those believers anticipate enjoying it (Iannaccone 1998)). In Islam, Sayyid Qutb’s
writings in Egypt in the 1950s on the “sacred jihad” lent support to suicide planners
(Bergen 2002, 51). So while there is no clear religious connection to core suicide beliefs,
aspects of all religions could be useful to radicals recruiting for suicide missions.
Altruism, combined with a belief that the welfare of others will be improved by
the act –  may apply to both religious and secular terrorists. In the case of suicide attacks
not only is a sense of altruism required, but also an exaggerated belief in the benefit to
their cause that will result from a successful attack. For instance, the September 11
th
terrorists may have believed that their act would help topple the Saudi government. A
Hamas suicide bomber might believe that a single destructive act would make some
significant contribution to creating an Islamic state in Palestine. These beliefs stretch
credulity but reflect a common bias of decision-makers in overestimating their potential
to affect change (Jervis 1976). 
The combination of beliefs necessary for a rational martyr is not unlikely. While
we lack estimates of the incidence of different beliefs, only a small proportion of the
population need be committed believers if an organization exists which can identify and
recruit a cadre of suicide attackers. Iannaccone (forthcoming) points out that despite
conventional wisdom about “brainwashing,” research revealed that indoctrination played
only a minor role in recruitment to US sects. Thus it may not be an unusual problem to
find volunteers who prefer martyrdom to life, even without indoctrination.  The real
problem is in recruiting a reliable martyr. Radical religious groups have a strategic
advantage in recruiting reliable martyrs, an insight which requires an exploration of the
organizational structure of radical religious groups.Berman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 12
 For a quasi-rational choice alternative, see Elster (1984).
12
 Iannaccone (1998) describes the growth of conservative sects worldwide (p. 1471).
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Terrorist Clubs: Radical Religious Groups as Social Service Provision Clubs
Critical to our understanding of the role of Radical Islam in organizing armed
rebellions is the recognition that these communities, like other religious sects, are
commonly engaged in cooperative production of mutual insurance. Consider the
following puzzle for the rational choice approach: religious sects prohibit common
pleasurable behaviors and require sacrifices. Recruits must obey rules regarding diet,
prayer, dress, hair, sexual practice, relations to constituted authority, and marital fidelity.
Sacrifices such as burnt offerings irreversibly destroy resources. In European Jewry, a
circumcision irreversibly labeled a child as Jewish, an act that might put his life at risk by
destroying the option of pretending to be a gentile. A vow of fidelity or abstinence is also
a form of sacrifice, since it permanently restricts activities. Volunteer work required of
Mormons is a sacrifice of time with a foregone opportunity to accumulate human capital.
Study in a religious institution represents a sacrifice of the alternative potential use of
that time, be it in accumulation of human capital in secular studies or in accumulation of
earnings.
Limiting choices and destroying resources are puzzles for social scientists trained
in rational choice. Yet people voluntarily join groups that enforce prohibitions and
require sacrifices.  These groups stubbornly defy price theory, persisting in time-
12
intensive activities like communal worship, Sabbath observance and dietary restrictions
despite the historical increase in the shadow price of time. Strict sects show no sign of
disappearing and those with the most demanding practices are growing.   The modern
13
Anabaptist traditions (such as the Amish, Mennonites and Hutterites) are holding their
own while Ultra-Orthodox Jewry and Radical Islam are thriving, despite a multitude of
time intensive requirements.
Iannaccone (1992) pointed out the puzzle of prohibitions and sacrifices and
offered a solution, proposing that they are efficient institutions in the context of an
economic club that provides services to members through cooperative production. ThisBerman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 13
section summarizes his rationalization of religious sacrifices and extends the argument to
cover militia activity as in Berman (2003).
Clubs
A social interaction model offers an explanation for sacrifices. Group members
derive utility from (secular) consumption, S, and from time spent in religious activities,
R, such as prayer and community service. They also gain utility from the level of a local
public good A.
i i i (1)  U = U(S, R, A) for i = 1 to N members, 
1 2 3  11 22 33 U ,U ,U > 0, U , U , U  <0 .
Good A is nonrival and excludable, making it a club good. Members get A from
either a government, G, or the “club,” C, which uses hours of religious activity as an
input. Public safety is an example of a pure public good which could be provided by
government or by a club, perhaps as a religious obligation. Welfare services, schools,
hospitals and mutual insurance are examples of excludable, partially rival activities
commonly provided by religious communities.
i (2)  A = G + C({R}) , 
Members maximize utility subject to time and budget constraints. A fixed allocation of
ii time,  T, is split between the religious activity, R, and work hours, H, so that R = T – H.
Income is earned from wages w and spent on consumption of the secular good, S, at price
p, so that  
ii i   (3)  pS =  wH =  w(T-R ) .
Club good C is produced by voluntary donation of time by members. These
donations of time are difficult to monitor, since they are informal acts of charity, thus
creating a free-rider problem. Sects apparently induce members to donate time by
imposing a set of prohibitions which effectively reduce time devoted to activities outside
the club, such as dietary restrictions, dress codes and sabbath restrictions. While thisBerman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 14
rationalization of religious prohibitions has no implications for our argument about
suicide attacks, it should reinforce our faith in a club model of religious sects.
Efficient Sacrifice
Sacrifices are acts which irreversibly destroy value. They can be explained as an
initiation rite that signals type (Camerer 1988, Iannaccone 1992) analogous to other
forms of costly sacrifices that signal type, such as initiation rites in the military or hazing
in fraternities. To explain sacrifices Iannaccone augments his base model with
unobserved heterogeneity in the form of high wage (type 2) and low wage (type 1)
individuals. High wage individuals choose less religious activity (in the upward-sloping
part of a labor supply curve) as it is relatively more expensive for them, i.e., R<  R 
2 1
(Heterogeneity could alternatively be in preference for religious activities at the margin.
Heterogeneity in wages is chosen mainly to simplify the exposition.) Assume that the
value of the benign club good is given by the average of R, as would plausibly be the
case in a mutual insurance club, where the average donation of time by members to
mutual aid would matter.
High wage - low R individuals are potential “free-riders.” They would like to join
the high R club and benefit from its high average level of religious activity. Members of
the high R (low wage) club would rather not admit the high wage types, as the reduction
in the average level of religious activity would reduce club quality. Since access to the
externality is excludable, the high R (low wage) group can rid their club of free riders by
requiring a costly initiation rite, or sacrifice, which will exclude low R (high wage)
individuals from joining, keeping C high, at C=R .  Unlike religious activity, R, the
1
sacrifice benefits no one except through its role as a signal. Potential applicants must
reveal their type, which is otherwise unobservable, when they make a decision toBerman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 15
 This view of a religious sect as social service provision clubs has testable implications. The stronger the
14
sacrifice demanded of members, the higher the average level of voluntary religious activity and the greater
the degree of mutual insurance. That implication is confirmed in Iannaccone’s (1992) study of Christian
denominations and supported casually in Berman’s (2000) discussion of Ultra-Orthodox Jews. Among
Muslims at least some radical sects are active at social service provision, including the Hamas, the
Hizbullah and the Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt [Mishal and Sela (2000), Munson (2002)]. Other testable
implications of the club approach to religion are supported by evidence on Ultra-Orthodox Jews (Berman
2000) and Indonesian Islamists (Chen 2003).
 For a proof see Iannaccone (1992). For a formal derivation of the optimal sacrifice and a graphical
15
explanation see Berman (2000).
sacrifice, or not to sacrifice, time.  A sacrifice inducing only low wage types to sacrifice
14
is a separating equilibrium.
15
Recruiting
We have argued that finding willing suicide attackers is probably not that
difficult. The problem is in getting the right type. Radical religious sects are useful here
as they use sacrifices as signals of commitment to sort prospective members on their
unobserved attributes. Radical religious sects should therefore have an advantage in
recruiting suicide attackers if they can design signals of commitment that will distinguish
members who have the “right” beliefs from those who will pull out or even defect.
The Production Function of Suicide Attacks
Violent rebels such as guerrillas and terrorists are extremely sensitive to
defection. Consider the logistics of organizing a suicide attack on some target where the
potential victim can induce defection at any stage, from planning through the attack.
There must be enough operatives involved to recruit a suicide attacker, train that attacker,
record a video, observe the attacker to be sure his or her resolve does not waver, procure
explosives, identify a target, send the attacker on their way and then make a public
announcement taking credit. Assume that N operatives are required, excluding the
attacker. Each has some nonrival benefit B from a successful attack.Berman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 16
 Although it is often noted that taped interviews with parents show great support for the heroic deeds of their
16
children, these interviews are conducted after the attack. Parents know little beforehand, perhaps because they would
have a powerful incentive to inform or induce defection.
Figure 1: Operatives and Target
Any one of those N operatives, including planners, has enough information to
defect, destroy the operation, and collect a reward from the target’s side, all with one
phone call. Defection is not uncommon. Of the 189 Palestinian suicide attacks attempted
between September 2000 and April 2003, fully 77 were prevented before the attacker
detonated himself, presumably because someone provided information or defected (IDF
figures, reported by Zeev Schiff, HaAretz, May 3, 2003). Sometimes the information may
come from friends and family.
16
Operatives jointly produce a club good. Each makes a binary choice of  R=1
(loyalty) or R=0 (defection).  Together they produce a good  
,
where B(1) is the value of a “successful” attack and B(0) is that of a failure, so that B(1)
> B(0). Assume that membership in this group is exclusive and that the benefits of
success are shared in a nonrival manner among members (in prestige, political power,
deterrence of an enemy).Berman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 17
 We assume away the hidden information problem faced by potential victims attempting to bribe club
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members into defecting. How would the potential victim know that someone claiming to be a defector was
really planning to do any damage at all? That uncertainty prevents efficient Coasian bargaining, yet the fact
that leaks occur and defection takes place indicates that defectors find some way of establishing credibility.
Our results require only that the bribe offered to defectors be proportional to damage in some proportion
exceeding ". 
To induce defection, the target’s side would be willing to pay an amount D to
prevent the damage inflicted, including both the direct damage and the indirect effect of a
terrorized population.  (Terrorism is probably a negative-sum activity as the replacement
value of the damage to the victim may far exceed the value to operatives, B, so that B<D,
even if B(D) is an increasing function.) 
Assume also that operatives have income from some outside sponsor (who values
successful attacks) which is small but proportional "D, where 0<"<1. Assume that a
defector can extract the entire surplus, D, from the potential victim D.  
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Now consider the payoffs of operatives in a club providing both benign public
goods and the violent result of an attack. Substituting into equation (1), an operative who
remains loyal enjoys utility
 
where the first term is the payment from the outside sponsor split among N operatives
which each consumes. The second term indicates the personal satisfaction for loyalty.
The third reflects the augmented public good available to a loyal operative: government
provisions, G, the benefit of a successful operation B, and the value of the benign club
good C. A member who defects will be expelled from the community, receiving utility 
U (D + w , 0, G) .Berman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 18
He consumes the damage value D paid by the potential victim in addition to his outside
wage, w, gets no satisfaction from doing his duty, and receives only government 
provided public goods. In all, each operative faces the incentive compatibility constraint
. 
If that constraint fails for any of the N operatives, then the operation fails and they are all
exposed. The defection decision of the suicide attacker would look like (6) but with two
differences. First, it would be augmented with terms reflecting altruism or the hereafter.
Second, the left hand side reflecting utility in the present would be omitted.
Suicide Attacks as a Tactical Choice
To analyze when suicide bombing is the chosen tactic, we consider the possibility
of apprehension. Let p be the probability that the attacker is apprehended, exposing the
identity of all operatives. Apprehension is far more dangerous for the organization than
the attacker dying because an interrogated attacker exposes operatives. Assume that
exposure implies both a failed attack and capture or death of all operatives, which we
(prosaically) treat as setting utility to zero for exposed operatives.
Consider the conventional attack. Apprehension probability is a function of the
inherent “hardness” of the target, p(h). The difficulty, or “hardness,” of the target is
denoted by the real number h, which represents an index of defensive measures by the
target (or its government) and topography (as in FL 2003). Governments can increase p
by investing in protective measures, increasing h. The expected utility of an operative
from a conventional attack in the model including apprehension probability is
. 
In contrast, the utility of an operative from defecting is Berman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 19
. 
These choices are illustrated by the solid lines in Figure 2, which graphs the utility of
operatives against the damage done to victims for possible parameters. The steepest line
is the utility gained by defecting (7b). It increases most quickly in damage, D, because
the full value of D is available to induce operatives to defect. It begins at a low level, for
low D, because defectors draw no local public goods (B or C) from the club. Thus
defection is unattractive for low levels of damage, D.
For targets with a low probability of apprehension the utility-maximizing choice
is the conventional attack (7b), illustrated by the upper line. Utility for loyal operatives
using the conventional attack is high even at low D because they benefit from club goods
B(.) and C(.). It increases slowly in D because the subsidy is only "D (<D) and is split
among N operatives.
As this figure shows, as the probability of apprehension, p , increases, expected
utility falls; this is illustrated by the downward shift in the expected utility of a loyal
operative.  With high p the conventional attack is incentive compatible only for a smaller
C range of targets (0, D ) for which expected utility from an attack (7a) exceeds that from
defection(7b). This is how the model captures FL’s results for insurgencies: topography,
strong government and other environmental factors that raise p will limit the targets that
the insurgency can aspire to attack without operatives defecting. Thus one reason why
insurgency decreases as GDP/capita rises is that government resources invested in
apprehension will “harden” targets, limiting insurgencies to low damage activity. 
At high apprehension probability (for hard targets), suicide attacks become
relevant. They are less dangerous for the operatives (other than the attacker) but require
them to lose a member and compensate the bereaved family, which we represent as a
public bad Z lost in a nonrival way by operatives. Utility of an operative from a suicide
attack is thenBerman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 20
Figure 2: Conventional Attacks, Suicide Attacks and Damage
. 
Assume that the operatives have chosen a target of difficulty, D, and that they
have a willing suicide attacker. They then choose between the maximum of the expected
utility in expressions (7a), (7b) and (7c). The utility from a suicide attack is illustrated by
the serrated line in Figure 2. The operative’s utility is relatively low for the suicide tactic
at low damage because of the loss of the attacker (-Z). Expected utility increases more
quickly in damage for the suicide than for the conventional attack because the probability
of apprehension affects only the conventional attack. Consider the case of a high p, which
is relevant for a conventional attack but does not affect the utility from a suicide attack.Berman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 21
 . Note that in equilibrium D may be higher in conventional attacks if computed in a loss-of-life algorithm 
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We compare D in market terms, i.e., how much state authorities would pay to prevent such an attack..
 . This might explain the anomaly of Northern Ireland discussed in section 1, where suicide attacks are not
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used, even against members of the other religion. Diego Gambetta (personal communication, October 21,
2003) reports on research showing the strategic mimicking of identities so that potential targets of terror
D To the right of the point labeled D (for targets with damage greater than D ) suicide
attacks are preferred over conventional attacks.  
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At low probability of apprehension, the reduction in apprehension risk is not
sufficient to compensate for the high cost to the club of losing a member, so suicide
attacks are disfavored. 
The analysis also addresses part of conjecture C1: Suicide attacks are favored
when apprehension probabilities are high, for reasons adumbrated by FL: topography that
makes apprehension likely or a government strong enough and well enough funded to
harden targets. If we think of GDP/capita as a proxy for expenditure on apprehension
probability then we find that unlike conventional insurgencies, which decline
significantly in GDP/capita, suicide bombings are unaffected by GDP/capita, given that
they hardly occur at all in poor countries. The model is consistent with that outcome,
predicting that as defensive expenditures increase, the utility from a conventional attack
DE shifts downwards so that the interval (D , D ) of incentive compatible suicide attack
targets widens.
Coreligionists are Soft Targets
The analysis illustrated in Figure 2 provides an explanation for the striking results
of Table 2. Think of coreligionists as soft targets. The typical problem in defending
(“hardening”) a crowded target is the infeasibility of screening all individuals with access
to the target for every possible weapon. One solution is to predict which individuals are
at highest risk of harboring violent intentions (“profiling”) and then screen them
carefully. Yet coreligionists are typically similar in appearance, making profiling
extremely difficult.
19  Berman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 22
avoid identification as either Protestant or Catholic. These strategies make profiling more difficult.
In the few prominent cases of suicide attacks on coreligionists, targets are well
defended by means beyond profiling. That would be the case in the assassination of
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which was essentially
suicidal, or in the assassination of Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Masood by
Al–Qa’ida suicide bombers disguised as journalists (Rashid 2002, p. 87). In both cases
the attackers overcame any theological objections to killing Muslims, but may have
chosen the suicide tactic because a conventional attack on those targets implied almost
certain apprehension or death. Similarly with the LTTE assassination of Rajiv Gandhi on
May 21, 1991, in which a Hindu killed a Hindu. As the favorite to win election as Prime
Minister of India, he was an extraordinarily well defended target. This is also the case
with the suicide attacks in Iraq after the American occupation of 2003 – although against
coreligionists, the victims tend to be collaborators of the occupation, and thus better
defended than oil pipelines for which suicide attacks are not used. 
Section 3. Testing the Extended Club Model of Terrorism
We now turn to testable implications of our model, relying principally on data
from Israel. Our first prediction is that suicide attacks are used disproportionately against
hard targets. Palestinian insurgents in the West Bank and Gaza have a large choice of soft
targets. Settlers and soldiers use roads that pass through heavily populated areas or
through terrain that make them vulnerable to ambush. Settlements and military locations
are also quite exposed and in proximity to large Palestinian populations. The result is that
an attacker can fire a weapon or detonate a bomb remotely in such a way that makes
escape relatively easy afterwards, and can then blend into the local population. In
contrast, targets on the Israeli side of the “green” line are much “harder,” posing much
greater risks for the attacker. To reach the target requires passing through checkpoints
and perhaps a security fence at which his weapon could be discovered. Once on the
Israeli side, security forces and civilians can profile the attacker based on a “reading” of
his ethnic markers. After an attack the attacker faces a heightened version of all those
risks on the way back to safety.Berman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 23
Applying the analysis of Figure 2 to the Israeli case, the model predicts that
attacks within the green line are more likely to use suicide tactics. Table 4 reports data on
attacks and fatalities by location and method for the period from the beginning of the
second intifada (September 2000) through July 2003. Attacks include all forms of
violence toward Israelis and residents of Israel as recorded by the IDF, including suicide
attacks but also shootings, roadside bombs, stone throwing and other tactics. The vast
majority of recorded attacks are against soft targets in the West Bank and Gaza (96%).Berman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 24
The next column records fatalities due to attacks, which indicates that the
majority of fatalities (60%) are on the Israeli side of the green line. While there is no
direct information here about choice of methods, the methods used on the Israeli side of
the green line are clearly deadlier. 
Conditional on fatalities, one can compare method by location. Suicide attacks killed
eight people in the West Bank and Gaza while killing 401 on the Israeli side of the green line.
That is to say, 17,405 attacks in the West Bank and Gaza resulted in eight deaths due to
suicide attacks while 730 attacks on the Israeli side of the green line resulted in 401 deaths
due to suicide attacks. The data show that suicide attacks are disproportionately used against
the relatively “hard” targets on the Israeli side of the green line. 
Two further implications also flow from the club model. First, the stronger the social
service provision of the club, the greater the proportion of its attacks will be suicide attacks.
Second, the stronger the social service provision of the club, the higher the quality of its
volunteers for missions, and thus the more damaging will be its’ suicide attack. 
These predictions of the model come from the interaction of club strength, choice of
tactics and damage. Clubs with the ability to screen out high wage operatives will have an
advantage in such conspiracies. Consider heterogeneity in outside options, w, as above.
Assume parameters are such that operatives with good outside options will defect while low
wage types will organize a suicide attack (point F). I.e. there is some cutoff wage w’ for
which operatives are indifferent and w   <  w’ < w  . A club with the capacity to extract
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signals of commitment (low wages) can successfully exclude those high wage applicants who
haven’t demonstrated organizational commitment. These groups can more successfully
implement a suicide attack than terrorist groups that cannot screen out potential defectors.
Examination of (7) reveals why clubs put operatives with strong outside options (i.e.,
high w) under special scrutiny –they are more likely to defect. To be trusted, high wage
operatives would need to compensate by making credible claims to organizational loyalty
(e.g., that agents of the state murdered the claimant’s brother or raped his/her sister). ThusBerman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 25
high-wage recruits who pass the loyalty test should prefer to volunteer in low-wage high-
sacrifice organizations to protect themselves from defection.
Figure 3 also illustrates the second implication. If the environment favors suicide
attacks for a weak club, the attacks carried out by a club which is strong (in social service
provision) will also be deadlier. A weak club will use conventional attacks for relatively low
D damage targets, in the interval (0,D ) and switch to suicide attacks for higher damage targets,
D F F,  in the interval (D , D ). The most damage it can do is D since larger targets will induce
defection. A strong club has lower utility from defection for a given level of damage since
members are selected to have worse outside options, as represented by the rightmost curve.
That advantage is expressed as an expansion in its capability to carry out suicide attacks, with
no effect on the decision to carry out conventional attacks. Both strong and weak clubs will
D carry out conventional attacks in the interval (0,D ). The strong club will use a wider range of
DE targets for suicide attacks (D , D ), while the weak club will attack targets only in smaller
DF damage range (D , D ). 
Data from Israel and Palestine largely support these implications. Table 5 reports on
organizations which have carried out both conventional and suicide attacks in Israel and
Palestine. While they were selected according to the criterion of having carried out at least
one suicide attack, Figure 3 indicates that this is the range of organizations for which the
model can make predictions. We used the description of these groups in the ICT dataset
(whose coders did not have our theory in mind) to see if there was any mention of social
welfare provision by each organization, as an indicator of being a “strong club.” As our model
predicts, the two welfare providing organizations conduct more suicide attacks and have a
higher yield per suicide attack than the three non welfare providing organizations.
Table 6 reports on the second of those implications, that strong clubs will choose the
suicide attack tactic more often. Recall that this follows from Figure 4: strong clubs attack
FE targets in the interval D  through D  for which only the suicide tactic is effective, while weak
clubs cannot attack those targets for fear of defection. Table 6 lists the four Palestinian
terrorist organizations. Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have the highest proportion ofBerman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 26
suicide attacks, with 43% each. The PFLP follows with 13% and Fatah is the last, with 12%.
With the exception of the PIJ, the pattern is as predicted by the model. Hamas, the strong
club, chooses the suicide attack tactic at least as often as the PIJ, which has very little if any
social service provision, and more than Fatah and PFLP. The fact that the PIJ chooses suicide
attacks so often despite its lack of a social service provision network may indicate that
theology and indoctrination have a role in motivating suicide attackers. But our model helps
explain, despite theological fervor, PIJ’s relative lack of effectiveness (see Table 5). We
therefore see these results as broadly consistent with the model’s prediction that strong clubs
will exploit their organizational advantage in suicide attacks.
Section 4. Conclusion and Extensions
This paper combines data on suicide attacks and a theory of clubs to address the
question of when suicide attacks are employed as a tactic in an insurgency. It was motivated
by several unusual patterns in the data. Though insurgencies typically target poor countries,
suicide attacks are far more likely to target rich countries. Though insurgents often kill
coreligionists, they seldom use suicide attacks to do so. Though many types of groups have
grievances, suicide attacks are favored by the radical religious. 
To make sense of these patterns, we modeled the choice of tactics by rebels. We first
asked what a rational suicide terrorist would have to believe and discuss the role of religion in
those beliefs. Standard rational choice accounts find that with plausible utility functions,
recruitment of martyrs does not require appeals to irrationality or utter fanaticism. (But
manipulating the utility function of martyrs adds little insight.) The real test of the rational
model is not to explain recruitment per se, but rather recruitment of a type of martyr who will
lower the likelihood of defection. To address this strategic problem, we proposed a club goods
model that emphasizes the function of voluntary religious organizations as efficient providers
of local public goods. The sacrifices which these groups demand are economically efficient
and make them well suited for solving the extreme principal-agent problems in recruiting
candidates for suicide attacks who will not defect. Thus, religious radicals are effective (butBerman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 27
. Kalyvas and Sánchez-Cuenca (2005) provide analysis of cases where suicide missions might have been used but
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weren’t. 
not necessarily unique) dispatchers of suicide bombers. The model also analyzed the choice of
suicide attacks as a tactic, predicting that suicide will be used when targets are well protected
and when damage is great. Those predictions are consistent with the patterns that we earlier
described. Our model had testable implications for tactic choice and for damage achieved by
terrorists, which are supported by the data from the Israel/Palestine conflict.
Our model is not without problems. First, it is not obvious that our tests of the model
would work in cases beyond Israel. We therefore need to ask what insight this model gives for
interpreting other cases. Here we address several cases – Sri Lanka, Russia and Iraq – where
suicide missions have taken place under conditions somewhat different from those in Israel.
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In Sri Lanka, the LTTE’s Black Tiger’s use of suicide attacks highlights how specific
our model is to asymmetric warfare. The Sri Lankan government is not strong enough to
control the territory from which the LTTE operate, so that capture of an attacker does not
trigger assassination or capture of operatives, as would likely be the case in Israel or Iraq. 
The Sri Lankan environment favors standard insurgency, which for the most part is what has
been occurring since 1984. That insurgency is not carried out by an organization which fits
the club model: the LTTE is not religious, does not provide social services exclusively to
members and does not send valuable members on suicide attacks (Bloom 2005).
Even so, the club model provides insight into this case. For one, suicide attacks are
reserved for targets for which conventional attack is unlikely to succeed. In the early years of
the Tamil insurgency, as Swamy reports, most of the activity was intra-Tamil warfare, as
many groups vied to become the monopoly representative of the Tamil population of Sri
Lanka. For all the intra-Tamil killing, there were no cases of suicide attacks. Nor are there
suicide attacks in the civil war within civil war taking place among Tamil Tigers in 2005, on
the question of negotiation strategy with the Sri Lankan state. As Hopgood (2005, 72) points
out, when the SLA launched Operation Liberation in mid-1987, which established military
camps in the heart of the LTTE-controlled zones, the Black Tigers were formed to use suicideBerman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 28
attackers (as substitutes for missiles) to go after these targets, as an alternative to cruise
missiles (Hopgood 2005, 75). Second, the LTTE has recognized the immense problem of
defection. Gambetta (2005) points out that the Black Tigers “are subject to a commitment
pressure by having a ritual dinner with their leader, Pirabakaran, before the missions—a
subsequent defection would imply a catastrophic loss of faith.” This suggests that our model’s
focus on the problem of defection is not unique to the Israel case. Finally, closer scrutiny
reveals that the secular nature of the Tigers can be overstated. As their war developed against
the Sri Lankan state, several observers have noted the use of Hindu symbols for purposes of
recruitment, and that they rely on the language of religious martyrdom to justify and reward
the sacrifice.
Similar anomalies appear in the case of the two Chechen wars (1994-1996; 1999–) in
Russia. In the first Chechnyan war, the so-called boyeviki (insurgents), according to Lieven
“lack a military hierarchy and organization, formal training, formal commanders and tactical
doctrine…” And Lieven also notes that there were numerous reports in the first war where
“death squads shoot people [other Chechens] on the square, kill members of parliament inside
the parliament building, and, finally shoot a dozen disloyal policemen at the city’s police
headquarters – the killing of Chechens by Chechens…In front of video cameras, Shamil
Basayev executed an old man who had been a local administrator in his native village…” This
was hardly a war organized by a coherent organization seeking to maximize effect by going
after spectacular hard targets (Tishkov, 2004, quoting Lieven).
Yet, again, our model captures key strategic elements in the Chechen insurgency.
First, the primary targets for Chechen suicide missions are Russian civilian and military
complexes, which are hard targets. The largely Eastern Orthodox Russian police and military
profile Muslims from the Caucasus and keep them under strict surveillance. Conversely, soft
targets (for example, the so-called Chechen traitors to the cause, who are not well-protected
by the Russian army) do not merit suicide missions. Second, Chechen suicide attacks did not
begin until after Wahhabi fundamentalists, funded by the bin Laden network, began operating
in Chechnya. They provided locals with needed social services. There was, for example, a
$1,000 reward for new converts, and families of converts got stipends of $100 per monthBerman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 29
during the war. In exchange, the Wahhabi demanded sacrifices. Women were forced out of
the job market. The new religious leaders demanded “compulsory prayers, Arab clothes, a ban
on shaving, banishment of the ustazes [Sufi shaykhs],” and clean breaks from family (Tishkov
1004, 172-6). These Wahhibis, Tishkov shows, have been the source of the suicide strategy.
In sum, suicide missions in the Chechen rebellion are connected with hard targets and social-
benefit providing clubs.
In Iraq, where suicide attacks after the American-led invasion occurred after the period
covered in our dataset, it is too early to put any of our hypotheses to test. The big problem that
our model will need to face is that after the data are in, the modal country will become Iraq
and many of these attacks will be against coreligionists. These data will compel model
adjustment. Yet there are signs that the model has explanatory power in this case. It would
predict that the suicide attacks aimed at property and people close to the “Green Zone” (where
Americans are the hardest targets of all) are the work of religious radicals, organized as clubs,
from abroad. Although many targets are co-religionists, they tend to be American
collaborators who are better protected than other Iraqis and therefore hard targets. Meanwhile,
the model would predict that the rump Ba’athists are conducting a parallel insurgency of
conventional attacks against soft targets: mortar attacks on villages, ambushes on the route to
Baghdad from the airport, and bombs planted on oil pipelines. If this division of insurgent
labor turns out to be correct, it would add credence to our model.
A second problem for our model concerns the relationship of wealth to tactic choice.
In the model poverty should breed terrorism as it lowers the outside options of club members.
That would appear to be inconsistent with the findings of Berrebi (2003) and Krueger and
Maleckova (2003) who find that leaders and suicide attackers tend to have about the same
income levels as their neighbors, and higher educational levels. It may be critical here to
distinguish between incentives to join the club, incentives to defect and the selection that goes
on inside. Self-selection would suggest that the leaders have a higher skill level. One wouldn’t
think that bin Laden’s lieutenants would choose illiterate Afghan Jihadists for flight school in
Florida if disaffected students in Europe were available. Even among attackers, those chosen
to carry out suicide attacks are carefully screened to reduce their probability of defection orBerman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 30
. RAND analysts, for example, advertise a dataset of suicide attacks with far more observations than reported here,
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but the raw data are not publicly available (Hoffman 2003).
capture, either by ensuring that they were trusted members of the organization or by their
having some motivation for revenge, such as losing a family member to the enemy. The
accuracy of warnings of attack in Israel indicates that defectors and informants exist. What
this suggests is that operatives can be relatively well-to-do but they would be reliable to the
extent that they have credibly foresworn outside options.
More theoretical and empirical work is in order to account formally for nonreligious-
based clubs and the reliance on cadres with high outside options. Here we give only intuitions
for future modeling.  We still lack a standard dataset of suicide attacks in particular and
terrorist attacks in general.  The data on total suicide attacks are very sensitive to definition.
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In the dataset presented herein, we did not count self-immolation or waves of soldiers
marching into sure-death tank formations (as in the Iran-Iraq war) as examples of suicide
attacks, and they surely bear a family resemblance to the phenomenon that we have isolated.
But even with data on the dependent variables presented herein, there ought to be further tests
of our model. For example, an observable implication of our model is that the more benign
local public goods (mutual insurance, physical protection) provided to members, the lower the
defection rate. That would be especially true when the state and market do not provide
substitutes to these services, as in failed states. Another observable implication is that the
higher the potential damage caused by the attacks, the greater the incentive to defect. These
implications require testing beyond the Palestinian case.
While work still needs to be done for a fuller understanding of the logic of suicide
attacks, this paper, through the use of a club model combined with a distinction between hard
and soft targets helped explain three puzzles in tactical choice of rebels. (1) Suicide attacks
have seldom been used against coreligionists because they are soft targets and can be attacked
with less costly tactics. (2) Suicide attacks target rich countries, again because they present
the harder targets. (3) Suicide attacks have been used disproportionately by radical religious
groups because as strong clubs they can more easily overcome the defection constraint.Berman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 31
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  . Most datasets classify the perpetrators as coming from “the West Bank”. For purposes of this paper, the
22
Palestinians are under the de facto control of Israel, and are fighting an insurgency either to take control
over all of Palestine (capture the center) or to build a Palestinian state on some portion of current-day Israel.
Suicide bombing is a tactic in the pursuance of this goal. 
 . Criteria for what constitutes a terrorist act, and therefore a collection of the universe of cases of terrorist
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acts, are much disputed. In the ICT dataset, for example, there is a racialist bias. African terrorism appears
if blacks kill white civilians, but not if blacks kill black civilians. There is also a pro-state bias, as state
induced terrorism (e.g. the Sinhalese burning of Tamil properties in 1983) is not included. Suicide attacks,






This paper merges two datasets on suicide terrorism. The first is from Pape (2003,
357-60). The second is from the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, at the
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, available on the web at: [http://www.ict.org.il/]. This
version was downloaded Sept. 12, 2003. The dataset goes from 1980 through 2002, with the
most recent suicide attack on November 22, 2002. However, there are only nine events
recorded from 1980-87, so in effect the dataset covers fifteen years, 1988-2002. 
Some Descriptive Statistics on Suicide attacks
While suicide attacks (given the spectacular and deeply troubling moral narratives that
accompany the reporting of them) dominate our headlines, they are a rarely employed tactic in
insurgencies and cause few deaths. Tables A1 and A2 provide some descriptive statistics from
our dataset. There have been 236 recorded suicide attacks in eleven countries, with 42 percent
of the cases coming from Israel.  Using just the integrated ICT dataset, suicide attacks
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represent less than 10 percent of all terrorist acts in the dataset.   Using the combined dataset,
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suicide attacks have accounted for 5,922 deaths, nearly half of them from a single day
(September 11, 2001). Although the use of suicide attacks has tended to increase year-by-yearBerman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 34
 . In rather bad social science form, all too many papers seek to account for this outlier, obscuring the
24
general situation for suicide attacks of high publicity and low deaths.
over the past two decades (Table A2), if we consider the fact that since 1945 insurgencies
have caused over sixteen million deaths, the tactic of suicide bombing appears as only a small
footnote to that enormous death toll.
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Coding Rules
1. There were 56 observations that were in both datasets.
2. There were 40 observations in the ICT dataset for the year 2002, which was past Pape's
range, and we included these in the full dataset.
3. There were 132 observations in Pape that were not in ICT, and we added them.
4. There were 9 observations in ICT in the years of Pape's range, but not included, and we
added them.
5. There were 2 events in Pape (Dec 15, 1981, Iraqi Embassy; Aug 15, 1993, Egypt) with
insufficient information, and were not included in the merged dataset
6. There were 2 events in Pape (March 27, 2001, Hamas in Jerusalem) that was considered a
single event in ICT, and we considered it a single event in the merged dataset
7. There was a single observation in Pape, on Al-Qa'ida bombing of the US Embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania; we counted this as two events (as they occurred in different countries,
and I have a unique value for country of attack), and divided the total deaths in half, for each country.
8. Whenever Pape and ICT differed on deaths, we averaged the two death-counts, so some
death counts are not integers.
9. Whenever Pape and ICT differed on group name of perpetrators, we deferred to ICT (all
cases were in Middle East, and ICT had stronger explanations for choosing group)
10. For Sri Lanka, we counted as a missing value on religious differentiation if the bombing
was into a crowd that was random in regard to religion; a genuine religious difference
between perpetrator and target if the target was material (a ship; a government building; an
army base) but controlled by the state; n.b. that there is religious differentiation if the
bombing was aimed at a Muslim politician even he were from the North.Berman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 35
 Table A1
SUICIDE MISSIONS: SOME DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Number of Suicide Missions in Full Dataset 236
Number of Suicide Missions in ICH Dataset 107
Total Number of Terrorist Acts in ICH Dataset 1427
Percentage of Suicide Missions of All Terrorist Attacks in
ICH Dataset
7.4
Total Deaths from all suicide attacks (without 9/11/01) in
full dataset
5,922 (2,603)




SUICIDE ATTACKS BY YEAR AND TOTAL KILLED
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Tables
Table 1: COUNTRIES WITH ORGANIZATIONS THAT ORGANIZED SUICIDE
ATTACKS











Source: See Appendix Berman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 37
































































N 6373 6373 6373 6373 6373 6373
Countries 156 156 156 156 156 156
Source: FL replication data is described in Appendix. Suicide is the count of suicide attacks in
a country-year. Results are qualitatively robust to extension through 2001 (using 1999
GDP/capita figures) and to the exclusion of Israel.Berman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 38
Table 3









ATTACKS ON ISRAELI RESIDENTS BY LOCATION AND TACTIC







West Bank and Gaza    17,405    341        8
Inside Green Line         730    511    401
Total    18,135    852    409
Sources: Attacks, fatalities and fatalities due to suicide attacks inside green line are from the
Israel Defense Forces spokesperson’s office, as reported by Nadav Shragai in Ha’Aretz,
September 26, 2003. Fatalities in West Bank and Gaza due to suicide attacks are from the ICT
data for that period described in the Appendix.
Table 5
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF TERRORIST GROUPS








Hamas Yes 50 7.8
Hizbullah Yes 30 22
Palestinian Islamic Jihad No 23 3.8
Fatah (Fatah, Fatah Tanzim,
and Martyrs of al-Aqsa No 20 2.8
PFLP No 2 5.5
Source: See Appendix for data sources. 
* In its review of terrorist organizations, the ICT mentions the provision by the organization
of social welfare benefits to ordinary citizens, going beyond ideological, religious and
military tasks. Berman and Laitin, “Hard Targets”, p. 39
Table 6
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN ISRAEL
SELECTION OF SUICIDE BOMBINGS AS AN INSURGENCY TACTIC
Group All terrorist attacks Suicide Attacks Percentage
Hamas 115 50 43%





PFLP 16 2 13%
For all terrorist attacks, data from ICT dataset (http://www.ict.org.il/), data as analyzed on
their dataset on October 23, 2003. For suicide attacks, data are the combined ICT and Pape
dataset. First step, we took the data from Table 6 for column two. Second step, we asked for
all terrorist events in the ICT dataset for each of the four organizations listed on the table.
These data are on column 1. We had to omit Hizbullah from these calculations because the
ICT dataset reports fewer total incidents of Hizbullah terror than the combined ICT/Pape
dataset on Hizbullah suicide attacks.